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[So F. No. 19037.

In Bank.

Sept. 20, 1955.1

LUCYLE W. PENCOVIC, Respondent, v. FRANCIS H.
PENCOVIC, Appellant.

-.... -.....

[1] Divorce-Support of Children-Modification of Allowance.Under Civ. Code, § 139, declaring that the portion of a divorce
decree making support allowances may be modified at any time
at court's discretion, trial court, in exercise of its discretion,
must consider the needs of the dependents and the ability of
the divorced husband to meet those needs.
[2] Id.-Support of Children-Modification of Allowance.-Orders
of trial court modifying that portion of divorce decree making
support allowances need not be based on actual income or
property of divorced husband, but may be based solely on
his ability to earn money.

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 280; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 703.
• and
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 8] Divorce, § 300; [4] Parent
Child, § 18; [5] Constitutional L~w, § 115; [GJ Constitutional Law,
Sll3; [7] Parent and Child, ~ 18.

-"',

be reached by this court which will be consonant with the
quality of justice which should be administered by a court of
justice, is that the judgment& as to all counts should bl."
reversed and the defendant should be granted a new trial.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
28, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of
the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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[3] Id,-Support of Ohildren-Modification of Allowance.-An
order increasing the amount of an a.ward for the support of
two children under an original divorce decree from $20 a
month to $50 a month for each child did not constitute an
abuse of discL'ction where the children, who were some nine
years older than at the date of the original order, had greater
needs for food, clothing and medical services j where their
mether, who had been their chief source of support, was
permanently disabled in an automobile accident and was
$1,000 in debt for the care of the children and the payment
of hospital bills; and where their father, who shortly after
the divorce founded and was the leader of a religious society
which paid him no salary as such but which paid all of his
expenses, including the support of his children, was an ablebodied man and had the earning capacity to discharge the
obligation of the increased support award even if the society
would not provide him with additional funds to pay such
award.
[4] Parent and Ohild-Support of Ohild.-A parent may not evade
the obligation to support his minor children by refusing for
religious reasons to seck or accept gainful employment.
[5] Oonstitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Religious Freedom.
-Although the guarantee of religious freedom of U.S. Const.,
1st Amendment, is binding on the states under the due process
clause of the 14th Amendment, the states may nevertheless
regulate conduct for the protection of society, and insofar as
such regulations are directed towards a proper end and are
not discriminatory they may indirectly affect religious activities without infringing the constitutional guarantee.
[6] Id,-Fundamental Rights-Scope.-Although freedom of conscience and the freedom to believe' are absolute, the freedom to
act is not.
[7~ Parent and Ohild-Support of Ohild.-The Constitution does
not compel the subordination of the statutory duty of a parent
to support his child to a rule of religious conduct prohibiting
gainful employment.
[8] Divorce-Support of Ohildren-Modification of Allowance.An order increasing the amount of an award for the support
of two children under an original divorce decree from $20
a month to $50 a month for each child was not inconsistent
with an order discharging a contempt citation on the ground
that there was no showing that the divorced husband was able
[4] See Oal,Jur., Parent and Child, § 18; Am.Jur., Parent and
Child, § 35.
(5] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, i ~ et ieq.; Ala..Jv..
Constitutional Law, § 3l2. .
.
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to pay all of the accrued arrearages where, though there was
direct evidence of the amount of such arrearages, it
might be inferred that it wa~ in excess of $2,000.

110

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Alameda
County increasing amount of award for support of children
and allowing divorced wife's costs and fees for her attorney.
A. J. 'Voolsey, Judge. Affirmed.
Gross & Svenson and Henry J. Gross for Appellant.
Edwards & Friborg and Alan G. Banks for Respon6.ent.
TRA YNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in
1937 and had two children, a son and a daughter. In 1944
plaintiff obtained a divorce and was given custody of the
children, who were then 6 and 4 years of age respectively.
Defendant was ordered to pay $20 per month for the support
of each child. He made one payment, entered the army, and
authorized an allotment for his children. From the time of
his discharge late in 1945 until 1951 he made no payments for
the support of his children, who depended in part on assistance from Alameda county. In 1951 the county instituted
criminal proceedings against him. He was found guilty of
nonsupport and ordered to pay $20 per month for each child
in accordance with the divorce decree and $10 per month for
each child for unpaid arrearages. Since then plaintiff has
received $30 per month for each child from defendant through
the probation officer of Alameda County.
In November 1953 plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging that
her earning capacity had been impaired in an automobile
accident, that the children required more money for their
support, and that she believed that defendant's income was
$1,000 per month. She requested the court to increase the
support for the children to $100 per month for each child.
The court ordered defendant to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt for disobedience of the original
support order and why that order should not be modified as
requested by plaintiff. After a hearing on the orders to show
cause, the court discharged the contempt citation and ordered
defendant to pay $50 per month for the support of each
child and plaintiff's costs and fees for her attorney. Defendant appeals.
[1] Section 139 of the Civil Code provides. "That portioa
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of the decree or judgment making any such [support] allowance or allowances •.. may be modified or revoked at any
time at the discretion of the COllrt. . . . " In the exercise of
its discretion, the trial court must considu the need~ of the
• dependents and the ability of the husband to meet those
needs. (SweeZey v. SweeZey, 28 Ca1.2d 389, 394 [170 P.2d
469].) [2] Its orders, however, need not be based upon the
actual income or property of the husband, but may be based
solely upon his ability to earn money. ("Webber v. Webber,
33 Cal.2d 153, 160 [199 P.2d 9~4:]; Eidenmuller v. Eidenmuller, 37 Cal. 364, 366; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 83 Cal.App.
2d 71, 79 [187 P.2d 840].) [3] No abuse of discretion is
disclosed by the record in this case. There is ample evidence
of changed circumstances and of defendant's financial ability
to meet his children's needs and of his ability to earn money
in the future.
The two children, now teenagers attending high school,
have greater needs for food, clothing, and medical services
than at the date of the original order. Living expenses are
greater, but their mother, who has been their chief source
of support, was permanently disabled in an automobile accident, spent a year and one half in a hospital, and is $1,000
in debt for the care of the children and the payment of
hospital bills. She is employed as a Blue Cross Hospital clerk
at $200 a month, but because of her injury cannot work
steadily. For two and one half years she was completely unemployed and her earnings for the past year have been less
than $150 a month. Since it now costs $127 a month for
the care of the son and $118 a month for the care of the
daughter, she was been unable to feed and clothe herself and
the children on her earnings.
When plaintiff obtained the interlocutory decree, defendant
told her that he would "plan h·is life accordingly so he would
be protected." He said that he would "form this organization where people would giTe all their possessions into the
organization and he would be the head of the organization,
nothing would be in his name, everything would be in the
name of the organization, yet he would have them arrange
for all the money he wanted to use any time he wanted it."
Defendant's principal contention is that he has neither
money nor property nor earnings and that he is therefore
without ability to pay the increased amounts. At no time
has he contended that he is unable to earn sufficient money
to support the children. la 1941 and 1942 he waa eIDi>lo;yed

Sept. 1955]

PENCOVIC t1. PENCOVIO
[45 C.2a 97; 287 P.2d SOl]

)

l
I

r'

f",

101

at the shipyards in Oakland as a timekeeper, and at the
time of the divorce he was working as a machinist's helper
for about $75 a wcek. ShortlJ; after the divorce he changed
his name to Krishna Venta and founded a religious society,
the "W.K.F.L. Fountain." (The letters stand for wisdom,
knowledge, faith, and love.) The society was incorporated
in 1951 and is governed by a board of directors and officers.
Defendant is the treasurer of the society and its spiritual
leader or "Master." Neither he nor anyone connected with
the society receives a salary as such. About 100 members reside at a home maintained by the society at Canoga Park in
Ventura County. They have a communal system of living
and none of them works on the outside. All food, clothing,
and medical care are provided by the society. Funds are
obtained from new members, who transfer all their property
to the society on being admitted to membership, and from
gifts, plays presented by the members, and donations received
for fighting fires. Defendant and his present wife and their
young daughter occupy a small room and five other children
of defendant's sleep in a garage made into a bedroom with
three other children living at the society's home. Defendant
makes periodic automobile trips to Denver to carryon the
work of the society. Occasionally he stops at Las Vegas and
Reno tie gamble, and on some occasions the society and various
persons have advanced him money for that purpose, but he has
never won. In Las Vegas he once lost $2,900 and in payment
drew checks on a bank in which he had no funds. The society
paid part of the amount due on the checks and no civil action
or criminal charges. were brought against defendant for
issuing them. The society paid the cost of a trip by defendant
to Europe in 1949, a trip to South America in 1951, and
trips in 1952 to 54 cities in the United States to study fire
equipment and fire departments and to advance the cause of
the society. A member of the board of directors usually accompanies him on trips and handles temporal matters. For
all contributions that he receives and for all his expenditures
defendant accounts to the board of directors, and there is no
evidence of unauthorized use of society funds. The society
pays all of defendant's expenses, including the $60 per month
for the support of his children ordered at the criminal proceeding, and at the time of that proceeding it also s~pplied
him with funds with whic11 to buy gifts for his children, ice
skates costing $65 for his daughter and a wrist watch, tennis

)
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shoes, and othCi." gifts for his son. It also paid the fees for
his attorney in both the 1951 and present proceedings.
Although defendant contends that the support he receives
from the society constitutes only a gift to him and that his
services are in turn rendered gratuitously, the trial court could
reasonably infer from the foregoing evidence that he is in
fact receiving compensation from the society for the services he renders as its spiritual leader or "Master." Moreover,
in the past this compensation has been measured by defendant's needs, including his obligation to support his children.
Accordingly, the trial court could reasonably conclude that
the amount of his compensation would be increased to meet
any additional obligation imposed upon him, and his reasonable expectation of securing such additional compensation
could properly be considered in determining his ability to
pay. (Woolams v. lVoolams, 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 7 [251 P.2d
392] ; see Federb'ltsh v. Federbush, 5 N.J.Super. 107 [68 A.2d
473, 476] ; In re Aspenleiter's Estate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 486, 488.)
Under these circumstances the fact that the society is not
obligated to support defendant's children is immaterial, for
in fact it has adopted as the measure of his compensation
his needs, including his obligation to support his children.
The society and defendant, by determining the compensation
by reference to defendant's needs instead of by adopting a
fixed rate, cannot compel the court to ignore the fact that
under their existing arrangement defendant's compensation
as measured by his needs includes his obligation to support
his children.
Even if the trial court concluded, however, that defendant
was not receiving compensation, but only gifts, and that the
society would not provide him with additional funds to dis.
charge the increased support award, its order would not constitute an abuse of discretion, Defendant is an able-bodied
man, and the trial court could reasonably conclude that he
had the earning capacity to discharge the obligation of the
support award. [4] By refusing for religious reasons to
seek or accept gainfnl employment defendant may not evade
that obligation. [5] Although the guarantee of religious
freedom of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States is binding on the states under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303 [60 S.Ct, 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352]),
the states may nevertheless regulate conduct for the protection of society, and insofal' as such regulations are directed
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towards a proper end and are not discriminatory, they may
indirectly affect religious activities without infringing the
constitutional guarantee..[6] Although freedom of conscience and the freedom to believe are absolute, the freedom
to act is not. (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169170 [64 8.0t. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645]; Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-304 [60 S.Ot. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128
A.L.R. 1352] ; Jacobson v.Massachusetts, 197 U.S. l1, 29 [25
8.0t. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643] ; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342344 [10 8.0t. 299, 33 IJ.Ed. 637] ; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114
U.S. 15, 45 [5 8.0t. 747, 29 L.Ed. 47] ; Reynolds v. Un1~ted
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 [25 L.Ed. 244] ; People ex rel. Wallace
v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 626, 104 N.E.2d 769, 30 A.L.R.2d
1132, cert. den., 344 U.S. 824 [73 8.0t. 24, 97 L.Ed. 642],
and see cases collected in 30 A.L.R.2d 1138-1141.) [7] Oertainly there are few interests of greater importance to the
state than the proper discharge by parents of their duties
to their children, and the Oonstitution does not compel the
subordination of the statutory duty of a parent to support
his child to a rule of religious conduct prohibiting gainful
employment.
[8] Defendant contends finally that the order increasing
the amount of the support award is inconsistent with the
order discharging the contempt citation, on the ground that
the court stated with respect to the alleged contempt that
he did not "think there has been any showing •.. of ability
to pay." Since defendant was paying $20 per month on the
accrued arrear ages in addition to the $40 per month currently due under the w.-iginal order, the contempt citation
was presumably based on his failure to pay all of the balance
of the accrued arrearages. There is no direct evidence of
the amount of such arrearages but it may be inferred that it
is in excess of $2,000. Accordingly, it cannot be said that
the tria1 court's conclusion that defendant was unable to
pay all of the accrued arrearages was inconsistent with its
implied finding that he was cUl'rently able to pay the increased
monthly award.
The orders are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., c o n c u r r e d . '

